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Abstract
Spoof detectors are classifiers that are trained to dis-
tinguish spoof fingerprints from bonafide ones. However,
state of the art spoof detectors do not generalize well on
unseen spoof materials. This study proposes a style transfer
based augmentation wrapper that can be used on any ex-
isting spoof detector and can dynamically improve the ro-
bustness of the spoof detection system on spoof materials
for which we have very low data. Our method is an ap-
proach for synthesizing new spoof images from a few spoof
examples that transfers the style or material properties of
the spoof examples to the content of bonafide fingerprints
to generate a larger number of examples to train the clas-
sifier on. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach
on materials in the publicly available LivDet 2015 dataset
and show that the proposed approach leads to robustness to
fingerprint spoofs of the target material.
1. Introduction
Fingerprints have been widely used for identification of
individuals for more than a century. Their uniqueness and
persistence makes it one of the most reliable forms of bio-
metric traits that have been used to augment security in a va-
riety of applications. However, with the widespread use of
fingerprint recognition systems, they are now a prime target
of attackers. Fingerprint spoofs (i.e. fake/gummy fingers)
can be fabricated using commonly available materials such
as Play Doh, Gelatin etc. with high fidelity, making them
hard to distinguish from bonafide fingerprints. These mate-
rials can easily fool the existing spoof detectors especially
if they were not included in the training. With a plethora of
available materials that could be used to fabricate spoofs, it
is important to be able to learn the concept of what a specific
spoof looks like from just a few samples of it.
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Figure 1. (a) Bonafide fingerprint samples and (b) Acquired spoof
fingerprint samples fabricated using different materials.
One of the major limitations of many published anti-
spoofing methods is their poor generalization performance
across novel spoof materials, that were not seen during
training. To generalize an algorithm’s effectiveness across
spoof fabrication materials, called cross-material perfor-
mance, some studies have approached spoof detection as
an open-set problem1. [31] applied the Weibull-calibrated
SVM (W-SVM) to detect spoofs made of new materials. [5]
trained an ensemble of multiple one-class SVMs using tex-
tural features extracted from only bonafide fingerprint im-
ages.
Although, CNN-based approaches outperform the ear-
lier mentioned spoof detection approaches utilizing hand-
crafted features on publicly available datasets [14], these
require large amount of training data to avoid over-fitting.
1Open-set problems address the possibility of spoof classes during testing,
that were not seen during training. Closed-set problems, on the other hand,
evaluate only those spoof classes that the system was trained on.
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Figure 2. An overview of the proposed approach utilizing Universal Material Transfer (UMT) wrapper for synthesizing spoof patches.
With the advent of new fabrication techniques and novel
materials, it is increasingly challenging to include all spoof
fabrication materials and generate large datasets for each
new material for training. In this study, we show that as few
as 5 sample spoof fingerprint images can go a long way to
improve the robustness of spoof detectors towards a novel
fabrication material. It enables a framework, called Univer-
sal Material Translator (UMT) that can be used for cross-
material spoof fingerprint style transfer. Moreover, we show
that these style transferred images can be used effectively
for augmenting CNN-based spoof detectors, significantly
improving their performance against a novel material, while
retaining its performance on known materials.
2. Related Work
Fingerprint spoof detection has been approached from
both hardware-based and software-based solutions. Hard-
ware solutions usually rely upon detecting physical liveness
characteristics of a human finger, such as blood flow [20],
human odor [1] and multi-perspective images [9]. Software
approaches do not require specialized sensors as they work
with features extracted from captured fingerprint images to
perform spoof detection.
Conventional software-based solutions [25, 24, 13, 12]
extract hand-crafted features based on texture, physiol-
ogy or anatomy of the input fingerprints to detect spoofs.
Recently, learning-based approaches (CNNs in particular)
have been utilized resulting in a higher degree of accu-
racy than previous works. Nogueira et al. [28] uses transfer
learning from object-recognition CNNs pre-trained on Ima-
geNet [33], and fine-tuned with fingerprints for spoof detec-
tion. Pala et al. [30] uses randomly selected patches to train
a CNN architecture with triplet loss. Chugh et al. [3] utilizes
local patches extracted and aligned using fingerprint minu-
tiae to train a two-class CNN to detect spoof fingerprints. It
is based on the premise that noise related to spoof fabrica-
tion introduces artifacts, that is pronounced around anoma-
lous points in a fingerprint image i.e., minutiae points. It has
performed better with novel spoof materials than previous
approaches noted above.
Realistic image synthesis is a difficult problem. Early
non-parametric methods [32, 2, 7] find difficulty in gener-
ating images with textures that are unseen during training.
Machine learning has been very effective in this regard both
in terms of realism and generality. [11] and [10] perform
artistic style transfer, combining the content of an image
with the style of any other by minimizing the feature re-
construction loss and a style reconstruction loss which are
based on features extracted from a pretrained convolutional
network at the same time. Their method produces high qual-
ity results, but is computationally expensive since each step
of the optimization problem requires a forward and back-
ward pass through the pretrained network. [18, 38, 36, 21]
train a feed-forward network to quickly approximate solu-
tions to this optimization problem. [37, 6, 15] use meth-
ods based on feature statistics to perform style transfer. [8]
applied GANs to generate artistic images. [16] used con-
ditional adversarial networks to learn the loss for image to
image translation. [39] learnt to synthesize objects consis-
tent with texture suggestions. Our approach utilizes the ap-
proach in [15] for designing the proposed universal material
translator that is capable of producing realistic fingerprint
patches containing friction ridge information (content) of
bonafide patches and style information from target material
spoof patches.
3. Universal Material Translator
Studies in [28, 23, 31] have shown that when a spoof de-
tector is evaluated on spoofs fabricated using materials that
were not seen during training, there can be up to a three-fold
increase in the spoof detection error rates. [4] identified a
subset of spoof fabrication materials based on their optical
and mechanical properties that are crucial to train a robust
spoof detector. However, with the advent of new fabrication
techniques and novel materials, it is prohibitively expen-
sive and time-consuming to generate large-scale datasets
Figure 3. Training pipeline of the Universal Material Translator (UMT) wrapper. An AdaIN module is used for performing the style transfer
in the encoded feature space. The same VGG-19 encoder is used for computing content loss and style loss.
for each new material for training CNN-based approaches.
Therefore, it is crucial to generate high quality synthetic fin-
gerprint spoof images to address the lack of spoof training
data.
In order to move towards this goal, we desire to generate
synthetic spoof images that are similar in material style to
the spoofs for which we only have very limited number of
samples. It is possible that we might have only a few spoof
images of a particular material due to expensive fabrication
process or use of rare materials, and we cannot simply use
these few images to train a deep CNN-based spoof classifier.
Towards this goal, we propose Universal Material
Translator (UMT) wrapper, a setup that extracts the ma-
terial style characteristics from a few acquired spoof fin-
gerprint images2 and transfers it to the available large-scale
bonafide image database to generate synthetic yet realistic
spoof images in the desired target material style while re-
taining the friction ridge information of the source finger-
print. In our experiments, we utilize local patches of size
96 × 96 for style transfer instead of whole images. Fig-
ure 2 presents an overview of the proposed approach utiliz-
ing Universal Material Translator wrapper for synthesizing
spoof patches in target material style. From here onwards,
we refer spoofs acquired using fingerprint readers as spoofs
and spoofs fabricated using the proposed approach as syn-
thesized spoofs.
3.1. Material Style Transfer
[37] used an InstanceNorm layer to normalize feature
statistics across spatial dimensions given a style image, per
channel per sample. The equation for InstanceNorm is
given below:
IN(x) = α
(x− µ(x)
(σ(x))
)
+ β (1)
2Acquired spoof fingerprint images refer to the fingerprint impressions of
physical spoof specimens that are captured using a fingerprint reader, as
opposed to synthesized spoof fingerprint images which are generated im-
ages using the proposed approach.
In Equation 1, x is the input feature space, µ(x) and σ(x)
are the mean and variance parameters of that feature space,
respectively. It was observed that changing the affine pa-
rameters α and β (while keeping convolutional parameters
fixed) leads to variations in the style of the image, and
the affine parameters could be learned for each particular
style. This motivated [6], which learns alpha and beta val-
ues for each feature space and style pair. However, this re-
quired retraining of the network for each new style. [15] re-
placed the InstanceNorm layer with an AdaIN layer, which
can directly compute affine parameters from the style im-
age, instead of learning them – effectively transferring style
by imparting second-order statistics from the style image
to the content image, through the affine parameters. We
follow the same approach as described in [15] in our pa-
per, by transferring feature statistics from the target mate-
rial spoof to the input content bonafide in the feature space.
As described in AdaIN, we apply instance normalization on
the input content bonafide feature space however not with
learnable affine parameters. The channel-wise mean and
variance of the content bonafide’s feature space is aligned
to match those of the target material spoof’s feature space.
This is done by computing the affine parameters from the
target material spoof feature space in the following manner:
AdaIN(x, y) = σ(y)
(x− µ(x)
(σ(x))
)
+ µ(y) (2)
In Equation 2, the content bonafide patch’s feature space is
x and the target material spoof patch’s feature space is y.
In this manner, x is normalized with σ(y) and shifted by
µ(y). Our synthetic spoof generator G is composed of an
encoder Enc and a decoder Dec. For the encoder, we use
the first few layers of a pre-trained VGG network similar
to [17]. The weights of this network are frozen throughout
all stages of the setup. Given the content bonafide patch as
c and the target material spoof patch as m, then x is Enc(c)
and y is Enc(m). The desired feature space is obtained as:
t = AdaIN(Enc(c), Enc(m)) (3)
We use Dec to take t as input to produce Dec(t) which is
the final synthesized spoof stylized in the desired material.
In order to ensure that our synthesized spoof patches i.e
Dec(t) are matching the style statistics of the target material
spoof, we apply a loss Ls similar to [17] given as:
Ls =
∑L
i=1 ‖µ (φi(g(t)))− µ (φi(s))‖2 +∑L
i=1 ‖σ (φi(g(t)))− σ (φi(s))‖2
(4)
where each φi denotes a layer in the VGG-19 network we
use as encoder. We pass Dec(t) and m through Enc and ex-
tract the outputs of relu1 1 , relu2 1 , relu3 1 and relu4 1
layers for computing Ls. To ensure that the synthesized
spoof patches retain fingerprint (friction ridge) content from
bonafide patches, we use a content loss Lc which is com-
puted as the euclidean distance between the features of the
synthesized spoof patches i.e. Enc(Dec(t)) and the fea-
tures of the bonafide patches with the target style (t).
The effective style loss is given as:
L = λcLc + λsLs (5)
[22] goes into the theory behind why neural style trans-
fer works so well, by interpreting it as a domain adaptation
problem. Although we do not follow the gram-matching
approach, our style transfer still involves second-order fea-
ture statistics transfer, similar to what is achieved by gram
matrix matching.
4. UMT-Wrapper for Spoof Robustness
Once we obtain a spoof synthesizer G, we use the ex-
isting dataset of bonafide patches and generate a dataset of
synthesized spoof patches conditioned on the material M .
In our experiments, the bonafide fingerprints used for gen-
erating new spoofs in the target material style are the ma-
terials that we use in our training set in that particular ex-
periment. We combine this synthetic data with the exist-
ing training data of LivDet15 [26] for training our classifier.
Note when evaluating the performance on an unseen mate-
rial, spoofs of that particular material are removed from the
training dataset of the LivDet15 [26] split. Our approach
acts like a wrapper on top of any existing spoof detector.
If our approach is applied to a spoof detector, it can suc-
cessfully make it more robust to spoofs of particular target
materials just seen during training.
For our classification experiments, we use the Mobilenet
V2 [34] pretrained on ImageNet [33] as it is faster than other
architectures like Inception V3 [35] used in published stud-
ies. We follow a training procedure similar to [3].
5. Experiments and Results
5.1. Datasets
We use the Crossmatch sensor of the LivDet15 [26]
dataset in our experiments. For each image in the training
Figure 4. TDR% on unknown materials at FDR = 0.1%
and testing dataset, we perform Otsu’s Global Thresholding
[29] followed by a set of morphological operations to ob-
tain a segmentation mask for the fingerprint similar to how
Figure 5. Spoof patches synthesized from bonafide patches (first column) by our approach conditioned on a target material (first row).
it is done in [27]. To further remove any background noise,
we find the largest connected component in the foreground
part of this resultant image. We generate 30 patches of size
150× 150 which lie within the foreground of this resultant
image. For all the patches, we compute the orientation sim-
ilar to how it is done in [27] with a window of 64 and stride
of 32. We perform alignment on each patch by taking the
trimmed mean of the orientations, rotating the patch by this
mean orientation and doing a center crop of 96 × 96 from
the resultant image.
5.2. Training procedure
For the Crossmatch sensor in LivDet15 [26], spoof train-
ing dataset is fabricated using three spoof materials, namely
Ecoflex, Play Doh, and Body Double. To simulate testing
our method against a novel target spoof material, we train
an AdaIN spoof generator on fingerprint spoofs fabricated
using the other two (known) materials to learn an effective
style extractor and translator amongst spoofs in those two
materials. After this, we take k fingerprints of the target
material (material not used in training) which we want to
use for generating a synthetic spoof dataset. 30 patches of
size 96×96 are extracted and aligned from each fingerprint
image and these patches become the target material patch
set for our UMT-Wrapper.
We take a large number of bonafide fingerprint patches
(∼ 15000) such that the number of patches is roughly equal
to the number of patches of any one of the materials in the
LivDet trainset of the CrossMatch sensor. These content
fingerprint patches are fed into our UMT-Wrapper for gen-
erating synthetic spoof fingerprint patches that retain the
content of the bonafide patches with the style of the tar-
get material patch set. We add these synthetic fingerprint
patches along with the target material patch set to our ex-
isting training data of that classifier and test on a combined
set of the LivDet training and the testing splits of that target
material.
For each type of experiment, we run 5 different runs
where each run has a different set of style patches and differ-
ent bonafide images which are used for generating synthetic
spoofs. We report the means at each training epoch in Fig-
ure 4. We report the mean TDR and its standard deviation
of the last 15 epochs (from 50 to 65) in Table 1 and Table 2.
5.3. Implementation Details
For our experiments, we use k = 5. For the encoder
of synthetic spoof generator, we use weights pretrained on
ImageNet [33]. The encoder is the first few layers of a
VGG-19 network. The weights of this encoder are frozen
during training of the synthetic spoof generator. For the
training of our synthetic spoof generator, we use λc = 1.0
and λs = 10.0. We use the Adam optimizer [19] and a
batch size of 1. The learning rate of the generator and the
discriminator are both 1e − 5. For the orientation calcula-
Table 1. Cross-material performance (TDR (%) @ FDR = 0.1%) using EcoFlex, Body Double, and Play Doh spoof materials, without and
with using synthesized spoof patches in training.
Training Set Testing Set TDR (%) @
FDR = 0.1%
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + Body Double] Bonafide vs. EcoFlex 53.56 ± 3.05
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + Body Double + 150 Spoof EcoFlex Patches*] Bonafide vs. EcoFlex 59.99 ± 6.23
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + Body Double + 150 Spoof EcoFlex Patches + 15K Synthesized
EcoFlex Patches]
Bonafide vs. EcoFlex 61.40 ± 3.73
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + EcoFlex] Bonafide vs. Body Double 73.20 ± 8.59
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + EcoFlex + 150 Spoof Body Double Patches*] Bonafide vs. Body Double 85.01 ± 1.96
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + EcoFlex + 150 Spoof Body Double Patches + 15K Synthesized
Body Double Patches]
Bonafide vs. Body Double 86.24 ± 2.28
Bonafide vs. [EcoFlex + Body Double] Bonafide vs. Play Doh 76.99 ± 4.08
Bonafide vs. [EcoFlex + Body Double + 150 Spoof Play Doh Patches*] Bonafide vs. Play Doh 83.90 ± 4.64
Bonafide vs. [EcoFlex + Body Double + 150 Spoof Play Doh Patches + 15K Synthesized
Play Doh Patches]
Bonafide vs. Play Doh 86.49 ± 1.56
∗150 Spoof EcoFlex / Body Double / Play Doh Patches are generated from only 5 Spoof EcoFlex / Body Double / Play Doh images, respectively.
Table 2. Known-material performance (TDR (%) @ FDR = 0.1%) using EcoFlex, Body Double, and Play Doh spoof materials, without
and with using synthesized spoof patches in training.
Training Set Testing Set TDR (%) @
FDR = 0.1%
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + Body Double] Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + Body Double] 86.11 ± 1.95
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + Body Double + 150 Spoof EcoFlex Patches*] Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + Body Double] 84.68 ± 2.66
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + Body Double + 150 Spoof EcoFlex Patches
+ 15K Synthesized EcoFlex Patches]
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + Body Double] 87.08 ± 1.89
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + EcoFlex] Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + EcoFlex] 93.61± 1.31
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + EcoFlex + 150 Spoof Body Double Patches*] Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + EcoFlex] 93.59 ± 0.77
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + EcoFlex + 150 Spoof Body Double Patches
+ 15K Synthesized Body Double Patches]
Bonafide vs. [Play Doh + EcoFlex] 94.17 ± 1.03
Bonafide vs. [EcoFlex + Body Double] Bonafide vs. [EcoFlex + Body Double] 98.6 ± 0.26
Bonafide vs. [EcoFlex + Body Double + 150 Spoof Play Doh Patches*] Bonafide vs. [EcoFlex + Body Double] 98.88 ± 0.57
Bonafide vs. [EcoFlex + Body Double + 150 Spoof Play Doh Patches
+ 15K Synthesized Play Doh Patches]
Bonafide vs. [EcoFlex + Body Double] 98.55 ± 0.42
∗150 Spoof EcoFlex / Body Double / Play Doh Patches are generated from only 5 Spoof EcoFlex / Body Double / Play Doh images, respectively.
tion for alignment of fingerprint images, we use a window
of size 64 and stride of size 32. All our experiments our
performed in the PyTorch framework.
For the MobileNet V2 classifier, we also used pretrained
ImageNet [33] weights and cut off the last fully connected
layer and replace with a fully connected layer for two class
outputs. We also train this with an Adam optimizer with a
learning rate of 1e− 4 and a batch size of 64.
5.4. Results
In order to demonstrate the contribution of our proposed
UMT-Wrapper for making a particular spoof detector more
robust towards an unknown material M ∈ {Eco Flex, Body
Double, Play Doh}, we conduct three sets of cross-material
experiments for each material M , by adopting the leave-
one-out method.
In the first set of experiment, we test on the unknown
material M which is the material completely left-out from
training and we desire to make our spoof detector more ro-
bust to. Note that for testing on material M , we combine
the train and the test set of that material and use this as a
test set in order to increase the size of the test set with re-
spect to the live test set. In the second set, we include 150
spoof patches extracted from only 5 images from training
set of unknown material M in the training. And in the third
set, we also include 15,000 synthesized patches generated
using the proposed UMT-wrapper in the training. Table 1
presents the cross-material results for each of the three ma-
terials. It can be observed that including the 15, 000 synthe-
sized spoof patches in training results in an improvement in
TDR @ FDR = 0.1%.
It is important to ensure that adding the synthesized
spoof patches, does not degrade the performance of spoof
detector against known materials. We conduct a set of three
Figure 6. Effect of GAN loss on synthesized spoof patches
known-material experiments similar to the cross-material
experiments. Table 2 presents the known-material results
for each of the three subsets of 2 materials. It can be ob-
served that the known-material performance is sustained by
adding synthesized spoof patches in training. This indicates
the positive contributions of utilizing UMT-wrapper for im-
proving the generalization of a spoof detector while ensur-
ing robustness to known materials.
6. Addition of Adversarial Loss
In our work, we also experimented with the addition of
an adversarial loss in our UMT-Wrapper training. This led
to better visual quality of the generated spoof patches. A
typical GAN setup consists of a generator G and a discrim-
inator D, where D learns to distinguish between fake and
real images and G tries to fool D. We use a similar GAN
setup to [16] in our approach where bonafide patches are
used to generate synthesized spoof patches similar to ex-
isting spoof patches via a discriminator. We believe that
UMT-Wrapper + GAN supervision generates spoof finger-
print patches which are superior than normal UMT-Wrapper
in terms of Level 1 and Level 2 features (see Figure 6).
However, there was a reduction in the TDRs obtained when
adding an adversarial loss when compared to the experi-
ments where adversarial loss wasn’t added. We reason that
GANs introduce certain artefacts and noise in the generated
images which can be easily picked up by detectors and since
we pose spoof detection as a binary problem, it turns out to
be a problem to the current setup.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
This study proposes a framework for Universal Material
Translator to generate large synthetic spoof datasets of new
materials using only bonafide images and a few samples of
target material type. It is shown that the proposed approach
improves the generalization performance of spoof detector
on unknown materials while maintaining high performance
on known materials. We believe our work can provide a
direction to make spoof detection systems generalize the
understanding of what a spoof is. In our future work, we
would like to connect our approach to adversarial machine
learning and lifelong learning methods.
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